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DOES THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD’S PRECEDENTIAL OPINION PANEL
COMPORT WITH DUE PROCESS?
Patrick Lavery*
Inter partes review is an adversarial post-grant proceeding conducted at
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
that allows third parties to petition for reexamination of patents. Normally,
a panel of three administrative patent judges decides an inter partes review,
but occasionally the director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has
expanded panels on rehearing to find against the decision of the original
panel. The director has expanded panels on rehearing when the original
panel found against agency policy. This practice is known as panel stacking.
Parties to cases, judges, and scholars have all raised due process concerns
with such panel stacking. Recently, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
has taken a different approach to maintaining agency policy in inter partes
reviews with the establishment of the Precedential Opinion Panel.
The Precedential Opinion Panel is a special panel within the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board, with its default members consisting of agency leadership.
Use of the Precedential Opinion Panel supplants the need for panel stacking,
but it may have its own due process concerns. The main due process
concerns with the Precedential Opinion Panel are the director’s position as
a member of the panel and continued ability to manipulate the makeup of the
panel. To alleviate the due process concerns of the Precedential Opinion
Panel without getting rid of the panel entirely, this Note suggests that the
director either refrain from sitting as a member of the panel, fix the makeup
of the panel, or both.
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INTRODUCTION
In the realm of software and technology, VirnetX is probably not a
household name. VirnetX has described itself as an “Internet security
software and technology Company with patented technology for securing
real-time communications over the Internet including 4G LTE security.”1
The company touted its patent portfolio, which “includes over 112 U.S. and
international patents and over 75 pending applications.”2 Despite its large
patent portfolio, VirnetX is probably not commonly known among
consumers. However, companies like Apple and Microsoft certainly have
name recognition with consumers due to their innovations in software and
technology. Therefore, it may surprise some to learn that VirnetX has sued

1. About VirnetX, VIRNETX (June 3, 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/2020060
3200045/https://www.virnetx.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/9V66-J48H].
2. Id.
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these well-known companies for patent infringement.3 In 2010, Microsoft
settled with VirnetX, paying them $200 million in exchange for a patent
license.4 On the other hand, Apple has been fighting VirnetX in federal court
since 2010.5 In addition to federal court disputes, Apple has also sought
another means of defense to make VirnetX’s litigation disappear: between
June 2013 and November 2016, Apple petitioned the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) forty-two times for inter partes review (IPR) of
VirnetX patents.6 The USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)
conducts IPR, which allows third parties to challenge the validity of an
existing patent on various grounds.7
IPR can invalidate patents, like VirnetX’s, that are potentially worth
hundreds of millions of dollars to companies. With such large sums of
money on the line, interested parties should hope that when the PTAB
conducts IPR, it affords the appropriate due process. However, judges,
parties to cases, and scholars have all criticized the USPTO director’s “panel
stacking” in IPR as potentially violative of due process.8
Part I of this Note provides background on the U.S. patent system,
including the requirements to obtain a patent and an IPR, a post-grant review
proceeding. Part II analyzes whether the PTAB’s Precedential Opinion Panel
(POP) alleviates the due process concerns raised against the practice of panel
stacking in IPR. Part III recommends how the POP can be changed to better
comport with due process and discusses alternatives to the POP.
I. THE INNER WORKINGS OF PATENTS AND THE USPTO
A patent is a property right in an invention that the USPTO grants to the
inventor so long as certain requirements of patentability are met.9 Generally,
a patent term is twenty years from the date the application was filed.10 A
patent confers the right to exclude others from making, using, importing an
invention into the United States, offering for sale, or selling the invention.11
Once the USPTO grants a patent, it is not completely out of the USPTO’s
3. Steve Brachmann & Gene Quinn, The PTAB Killing Fields: VirnetX Patents Worth
More than $1 Billion in District Court Lost at PTAB, IPWATCHDOG (June 25, 2017),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/25/ptab-killing-fields-virnetx-patents/id=85042
[https://perma.cc/49M4-SRWW].
4. Jonathan Stempel, Microsoft Settles with VirnetX, to Pay $200 Million, REUTERS (May
17, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-virnetx-settlement-idUSTRE64G39
620100517 [https://perma.cc/SS3C-GUUM].
5. Nancy Braman, VirnetX Scores Partial Win in Its Latest Federal Circuit Case with
Apple, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/08/06/virnetxscores-partial-win-latest-federal-circuit-case-apple/id=111926/
[https://perma.cc/67TUMUWT].
6. Brachmann & Quinn, supra note 3.
7. See infra Part I.A.2.
8. See infra Parts I.B.2–3.
9. See General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Feb. 4,
2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerningpatents [https://perma.cc/H69D-DB8Y].
10. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
11. Id. § 271(a)–(c).
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purview. If a patent is flawed, the USPTO can reevaluate and possibly cancel
the patent.12
Part I of this Note discusses the federal patent system and explains IPR
and corresponding concerns of panel stacking and due process. Part I also
explains the creation of the POP and surveys its recent uses.
A. Power to Grant a Patent
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”13 The details of federal patent protection are left to Congress
and the USPTO, a division of the Department of Commerce that was
established in 1836.14 The USPTO grants patents15 and establishes
regulations that govern USPTO proceedings.16
1. Sources of Law and Obtaining a Patent
Although the Constitution provides for the grant of patents,17 the Patent
Act of 195218 is the main source of U.S. patent law. The most recent patent
legislation is the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act19 (AIA), which Congress
passed on September 16, 2011, and went into effect March 16, 2013.
The powers and duties of the USPTO are vested in an under secretary of
commerce for intellectual property and director of the USPTO (“the
director”) who is appointed by the president with the advice and consent of
the Senate.20 In general, the director provides policy direction and supervises
USPTO management, the issuance of patents, and the registration of
trademarks.21 The director may also establish regulations that govern the
conduct of USPTO proceedings.22
An invention must meet several requirements before the USPTO will grant
it a patent. First, an invention must involve certain patentable subject matter.
The Patent Act provides that:
processes, machines, manufactures,
compositions of matter, or any improvement thereof may be patentable.23
Further, an invention must be new,24 useful,25 and nonobvious26 to obtain a
12. See General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 9.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 1(a); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117–18.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1).
16. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–293.
19. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1).
21. Id. § 3(a)(2)(A).
22. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A).
23. Id. § 101.
24. Id. § 102.
25. Id. § 101.
26. Id. § 103.
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patent. Patents must also meet certain disclosure requirements.27 The
novelty and nonobviousness requirements are of particular importance.28 An
invention is not novel and therefore not patentable if it was in some way
known to the public before an inventor applied for a patent.29 Even if an
invention is novel, it may be considered obvious and therefore not patentable
if a person having ordinary skill in the invention’s relevant art could have
solved the problem the invention was directed to.30 Inquiries into novelty
and nonobviousness require an examination of the relevant “prior art,” which
is generally previous patents and publications that are material to the
patentability of the invention being examined.31
The USPTO’s main duty is to examine a patent application and determine
if the applicant’s invention is entitled to a patent.32 If the USPTO determines
that the applicant has adhered to the above requirements, the patent is
granted.33 These examinations can be especially time-consuming for the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements, as examiners must compare the
claimed invention to the prior art.34 This requires individual examiners to
conduct their own prior art searches to supplement the disclosure of an
applicant.35
As of 2019, patent examiners made up 9614 of the 12,652 federal
employees at the USPTO.36 The USPTO reported 665,231 filed patent
applications in 2019.37 On average, examiners spend only nineteen hours
reviewing a patent application.38 This includes “reading the patent
application, searching for prior art, comparing the prior art with the patent
application, writing a rejection, responding to the patent applicant’s
arguments, and often conducting an interview with the applicant’s
attorney.”39
Not every patent the USPTO grants is a “quality” patent. Generally, patent
quality is defined as patent validity, not necessarily the quality of the

27. For further discussion of patent disclosure requirements, see generally General
Information Concerning Patents, supra note 9.
28. See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
30. See id. § 103.
31. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-level
Application Data 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20337, 2014),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20337.pdf [https://www.nber.org/papers/w20337.pdf].
32. See General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 9.
33. Id.
34. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 31, at 7.
35. Id.
36. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., FY 2019 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
12
(2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY19PAR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8EH6-J4FN].
37. Id. at 167. This statistic represents preliminary data from 2019. The data will be
finalized in the USPTO’s financial year 2020 performance and accountability report. Id. at
167 n.1.
38. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 31, at 8.
39. Id.
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invention patented or the economic value of the patent.40 Legislators are
often concerned with patent quality as they feel low-quality patents can erode
investor confidence in patent rights and thus adversely affect the economy.41
These concerns came to a head in the early 2000s when the perception that
the USPTO was issuing large quantities of patents led industry actors to call
for better post-grant patent review procedures.42 Other reexamination
proceedings existed before the creation of IPR but were underused and
viewed as burdensome.43 This general desire for a cheaper means to deal
with low-quality patents led to the development of the AIA post-grant
reexamination proceedings.44 The most notable of the new AIA proceedings
is IPR.45
2. IPR and Its Alternatives
IPR is an adversarial post-grant proceeding in which parties can challenge
the validity of a patent on certain limited grounds. IPRs are conducted at the
PTAB, an adjudicative body within the USPTO.46 Members of the PTAB
include: the director, the deputy director, the commissioner for patents, the
commissioner for trademarks, and administrative patent judges (APJ).47 The
APJs are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the
director.48
The scope of IPR is limited. A party may challenge the patentability of
one or more of a patent’s claims under the novelty or nonobviousness
requirements and at that, only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents
and printed publications.49 The IPR process begins when a party who is not
the owner of the patent at issue files a petition with the USPTO.50 This
petition must contain in writing and with particularity: each claim
challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and
the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.51 The
owner of the challenged patent may file a preliminary response to this

40. See Colleen Chien, Comparative Patent Quality, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71, 76 n.32 (2018)
(“The most common definition of a quality patent is a valid patent.”).
41. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011) (“If the United States is to maintain its competitive
edge in the global economy, it needs a system that will support and reward all innovators with
high quality patents.”).
42. Colleen Chien et al., Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-grant Patent Reviews,
33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 817, 826–27 (2018).
43. Id. at 827; see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 46 (“Over the 5-year period studied by
the USPTO, it issued 900,000 patents and received only 53 requests for inter partes
reexamination.”).
44. Chien et al., supra note 42, at 827.
45. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319; see infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
46. 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 316(c).
47. Id. § 6(a).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 311(b).
50. Id. § 311(a).
51. Id. § 312(a)(3).
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petition, explaining why IPR should not be instituted based on the petition’s
failure to meet requirements.52
The director then decides whether to institute an IPR within three months
after receiving a preliminary response or, if there is no preliminary response,
within three months after the last date on which a preliminary response may
be filed.53 The director may not institute an IPR unless the director
determines that, based on the information provided in the petition and
preliminary response, there is a reasonable likelihood the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.54 The director’s
determination on whether to institute an IPR is final and nonappealable.55
Once an IPR is instituted, the PTAB reexamines the patent at issue for
validity in light of the challenges raised.56 The PTAB must sit as a panel of
at least three APJs who are designated by the director.57 Because IPRs are
adversarial trial-like proceedings, the petitioner and the patent owner are
entitled to discovery,58 to file affidavits, declarations and written
memoranda,59 and to have an oral hearing before the PTAB.60 During an
IPR, the patent owner may move to amend the patent by canceling a claim or
by proposing reasonable substitutes to the claims.61 Before the PTAB issues
a final decision, the patent owner and the petitioner may settle and terminate
the proceeding.62 If the proceeding does not terminate, the PTAB issues a
final written decision no later than one year after it instituted IPR.63 When a
PTAB decision becomes final, the director must issue and publish a
certificate that: cancels the claims that were found unpatentable, confirms
the claims that were found patentable, and adds new or amended claims that
were found patentable.64 Parties may appeal the PTAB’s final written
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.65
IPR is not the only way to challenge a patent’s validity. District courts
have original jurisdiction over any civil action related to patents, including
challenges to a patent’s validity.66 Parties may also challenge a patent’s
validity in a district court as a counterclaim in an infringement suit.67 District
52. Id. § 313.
53. Id. § 314(b).
54. Id. § 314(a).
55. Id. § 314(d).
56. Id. §§ 6, 316(c).
57. Id. § 6(c).
58. Id. § 316(a)(5).
59. Id. § 316(a)(8).
60. Id. § 316(a)(10).
61. Id. § 316(d)(1).
62. Id. § 317(a).
63. Id. §§ 316(a)(11), 318(a).
64. Id. § 318(b).
65. Id. § 141(c).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
67. When a defendant is sued for patent infringement in district court, they may claim as
a defense that the plaintiff’s patent, which they are alleged to have infringed, is invalid. If the
court finds the patent is invalid, there can no longer be a patent infringement suit against the
defendant. See 35 U.S.C § 282(b).
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court cases and IPRs concerning the same patent often run in parallel,68 but
IPR may not be instituted if, before the date on which an IPR petition was
filed, the petitioner or a real party in interest files a civil action challenging
the patent’s validity.69 Appeals from district court decisions relating to
patents are also heard by the Federal Circuit.70
Despite the fact that patent validity can be challenged in federal court,
several factors make IPR popular.71 First, IPR is not as costly as litigation.72
Second, petitioners in IPR proceedings benefit from a lower burden of proof.
In district court, patents are presumed valid and challengers can only
overcome this presumption with clear and convincing evidence.73 By
contrast, in IPR, there is no such presumption and the burden of proof is a
preponderance of the evidence.74 Third, IPR is a relatively quick
proceeding.75 Fourth, once instituted, petitioners usually succeed in IPR
more often,76 as compared to in suits in district court.77 Fifth, the Federal
Circuit generally affirms appeals from IPRs.78
68. Matthew Bultman, PTAB Taking Note of Parallel Litigation in Review Decisions,
LAW360 (Oct. 24, 2018, 9:39 PM), https://www-law360-com.fls.idm.oclc.org/articles/
1095512/ptab-taking-note-of-parallel-litigation-in-review-decisions [https://perma.cc/Q33QEE8R] (“Most of the patents challenged in inter partes review at the PTAB—approximately
85 percent in 2017—are involved in district court litigation . . . .”).
69. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1). However, a counterclaim challenging the validity of a patent
claim does not count as a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent for
purposes of this subsection. Id. § 315(a)(3).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
71. From September 16, 2012, to July 31, 2020, there were 11,845 petitions for trials
before the USPTO. Nintey-three percent (11,015) of those petitions were for IPRs. U.S. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF., TRIAL STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM 3 (2020), https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_20200731.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YZN-YBA6].
72. Josh Landau, Inter Partes Review: Five Years, over $2 Billion Saved, PAT. PROGRESS
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/09/14/inter-partes-review-saves-over2-billion/ [https://perma.cc/M3UT-KHG4] (“IPR has saved plaintiffs and defendants $2.31
billion in deadweight losses, primarily in the form of legal fees.”).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a); Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
75. Id. §§ 316(a)(11), 318(a). The median time to trial of sixty patent cases from 2013 to
2017 was found to be over two and a half years. See PWC, 2018 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 4
(2018), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2018-pwc-patentlitigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A54-7W8K].
76. From September 16, 2012, to July 31, 2020, the PTAB issued 3329 final written
decisions in AIA proceedings. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 71, at 10. Of those
decisions, in 655 (20 percent), all instituted claims were found patentable; in 600 (18 percent),
some instituted claims were found unpatentable; and in 2074 (62 percent), all instituted claims
were found unpatentable. Id. at 11.
77. A sample of district court decisions from 2008 to 2009 shows “roughly 43.0 percent
of patents that went to a final judgment on validity were invalidated, the technology-specific
numbers ranged from a low of 21.4 percent for optics and 25.6 percent for chemistry to a high
of 80.0 percent for biotechnology.” John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1099 (2015).
78. Daniel F. Klodowski et al., Federal Circuit PTAB Appeal Statistics Through April 30,
2020, FINNEGAN (May 29, 2020), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/americainvents-act/federal-circuit-ptab-appeal-statistics-through-april-30-2020.html
[https://perma.cc/NT5E-5SFZ] (“The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB on every issue in
524 (72.98%) cases and reversed or vacated the PTAB on every issue in 100 (13.93%) cases.
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Although widely used, IPR has become divisive in the patent world. Some
see IPR as an effective tool to combat patent trolls.79 For example, VirnetX
claimed Apple infringed its patents, so Apple used IPR to invalidate part of
the patent it was alleged to have infringed.80 However, others feel IPR too
easily invalidates patents that district courts may otherwise find valid.81 In
line with this criticism is the statement of former Chief Judge of the Federal
Circuit Randall Rader famously calling the APJs of the PTAB “death squads”
that were killing off patent rights.82 In addition to such labels, IPR has
weathered numerous constitutional challenges in the Federal Circuit and the
U.S. Supreme Court.83 This controversy surrounding IPR is not surprising
considering the laborious process of obtaining a patent,84 the fees associated
with the process,85 and the importance intangible assets, such as patent rights,
can have for a company.86

A mixed outcome on appeal, where at least one issue was affirmed and at least one issue was
vacated or reversed, occurred in 68 (9.47%) cases.”).
79. A patent troll is some person or some entity that buys patents cheaply from companies
that are under financial stress. The claims of these patents are often very broad. The trolls
will use these broad patents to threaten those they feel infringe their patents with litigation
unless the alleged infringer pays a steep licensing fee. Often the alleged infringers will pay
the licensing fees, even if they think the trolls’ threats are meritless, so that the alleged
infringers do not have to spend the time in litigation. Patent Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims
[https://perma.cc/HPF3-DWF5]
(last visited Oct. 3, 2020); see also Grace Heinecke, Note, Pay the Troll Toll: The Patent
Troll Model Is Fundamentally at Odds with the Patent System’s Goals of Innovation and
Competition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1153, 1170–73 (2015) (explaining typical patent troll
behavior).
80. See generally VirnetX Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 909 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
81. Gene Quinn et al., PTAB Facts: An Ugly Picture of a Tribunal Run Amok,
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/08/ptab-facts-uglypicture-tribunal-run-amok/id=91959/ [https://perma.cc/QX3A-GDNN] (“[T]he PTAB is
substantially more likely to find patents to be defective than a Federal District Court, and in
fact have found numerous patents to be defective even after patentability has been confirmed
in federal courts.”).
82. See Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says,
LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www-law360-com.fls.idm.oclc.org/articles/567550/ptab-sdeath-squad-label-not-totally-off-base-chief-says [https://perma.cc/S2LU-GZCU].
83. See Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018)
(holding that IPR does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution);
Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that the retroactive
application of IPR proceedings to pre-AIA patents is not an unconstitutional taking under the
Fifth Amendment).
84. See generally Patent Process Overview, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Nov. 11,
2014), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-process-overview#step1 [https://
perma.cc/9EDQ-TQQX].
85. See generally USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Sept. 1, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule
[https://perma.cc/W99F-SA5Z]. These USPTO filing fees are in addition to any legal fees,
assuming an applicant seeks the help of a lawyer.
86. See Kristi L. Stathis, Ocean Tomo Releases 2015 Annual Study of Intangible Asset
Market Value, OCEAN TOMO (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.oceantomo.com/blog/2015/03-05ocean-tomo-2015-intangible-asset-market-value [https://perma.cc/Q25C-VHNK] (noting that
in 2015 the average value of intangible assets (which includes patents) accounted for 84
percent of market value among S&P 500 companies).
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B. The Criticisms of Panel Stacking
It is important to note that the standard federal model for agency
adjudication vests final decision-making authority in the agency head.87
PTAB adjudications, including IPR, differ from the standard federal model
in this respect because Congress did not give the director final decisionmaking authority over PTAB adjudications.88 Agency-head direct review of
adjudication is an important means to ensure consistency in adjudicative
outcomes and consistent application of agency policy.89 This lack of direct
review may have pushed the director toward other means of maintaining
consistency and policy in PTAB adjudications.
From time to time, the PTAB has issued IPR decisions that are not aligned
with USPTO policy. In such cases, the director may expand the original
PTAB panel on rehearing, so that the new expanded panel will rule against
the original panel and align with USPTO policy. This practice is called panel
stacking. Many have criticized panel stacking as potentially violative of due
process. Part I.B explains panel stacking and surveys due process criticisms
of the practice.
1. Expanded Panels: A Means for the Director to Manipulate PTAB
Decisions?
A panel of at least three PTAB members must hear every IPR.90 However,
this does not mean that a panel need only consist of three APJs.91 The
USPTO’s current Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 1, which was
released in September 2018, explains how the PTAB can expand a panel.92
SOP 1 first notes that the PTAB does not favor expanding panels, and it will
not ordinarily do so.93 However, from time to time, an expanded panel may
be used to secure and maintain uniformity in PTAB decisions.94 PTAB
members, a patent applicant, a patent owner, or a petitioner in a case pending
before the PTAB may suggest the need for an expanded panel.95 Ultimately,
the decision to use an expanded panel must be recommended by the chief
judge and approved by the director.96 An expanded panel may be designated
either: (1) after a case has initially been assigned to a panel and before that
panel has entered a decision or (2) after entry of a decision by a panel and
87. Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency
Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2019).
88. Id. at 159–60.
89. Id. at 176–77.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c).
91. Generally, an odd number of judges will be designated to decide cases in which a
panel is used. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURE 1 (REVISION 15), at 15 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/SOP%201%20R15%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC3F-PNL4].
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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request for a rehearing.97 In both cases, the APJs on the initial panel remain
a part of the expanded panel.98 Some have referred to the use of expanded
panels on rehearing as panel stacking, particularly when the goal of the
expanded panel is finding against the original panel.99
The USPTO is open about its use of expanded panels. In 2018, the PTAB
posted the findings of a study in which it focused on expanded panels in AIA
proceedings.100 The study clarifies that expanded panels are rare101 and that
most expanded panel decisions are issued as original decisions, not as
decisions on rehearing.102 The study lists several purposes for expanding a
panel: (1) dealing with issues of exceptional importance (guidance), (2)
maintaining uniformity of board decisions (consistency), and (3) responding
to written requests from the commissioner for patents identifying an issue.103
The study points out that expanded panels on rehearing almost always
reached the same underlying result as the first panel, except in two cases.104
The study is open about these two cases and notes that both dealt with the
issue of same-party joinder.105 The study states both panels were expanded
to ensure consistency and that all other decisions—before and after these
cases—have permitted same-party joinder.106 These two cases are Nidec
Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.107 and Target Corp. v.
Destination Maternity Corp.108
Nidec involved an appeal for IPR of a low-noise HVAC system patent.109
Broad Ocean filed an IPR petition against Nidec’s patent on two grounds,
novelty and nonobviousness.110 Due to faulty affidavits, the PTAB instituted
review only on grounds of nonobviousness.111 Broad Ocean filed a second
IPR once it had cured the defect in its affidavit and requested that the second
IPR be joined with the first.112 A panel of three APJs declined to join the
second IPR as they found it to be time-barred.113 They also found that the
exception to the time bar for requests for joinder under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)–
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 16.
Id.
See infra Part I.B.3.
See generally U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., CHAT WITH THE CHIEF: NEW PTAB
STUDIES IN AIA PROCEEDINGS: EXPANDED PANELS AND TRIAL OUTCOMES FOR ORANGE BOOKLISTED PATENTS (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/chat_with_the_
chief_march_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QTV-HD5L].
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 29.
103. Id. at 6. Such issues identified by the commissioner for patents would be those of first
impression or those governed by a prior board decision where the commissioner has
determined it would not be in the public interest to follow the prior board decision. Id.
104. Id. at 27.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
108. No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2015).
109. Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1014.
110. Id. at 1014–15.
111. Id. at 1015.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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(c) did not apply because the joinder provision does not permit a party to join
issues to a proceeding to which it is already a party.114 Broad Ocean’s
request for a rehearing of this decision was granted by an expanded panel of
five APJs.115 This panel determined that 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) was broad
enough to permit the joinder of the second IPR petition.116 So the expanded
panel granted review of the second petition and joined it with the earlier
instituted IPR.117 The expanded panel then found that the challenged claims
were unpatentable on both novelty and nonobviousness grounds.118 Nidec
appealed to the Federal Circuit, but the court did not address the PTAB’s use
of panel stacking.119 Target involved an IPR where a panel that had already
been expanded to five members expanded again into a seven-member panel
to find against the original panel after a majority of the five-member panel
concluded that § 315(c) barred a party’s attempt at self-joinder.120
2. Judicial Criticism of Panel Stacking
On several occasions, judges have raised concerns with the USPTO’s
practice of panel stacking. At the Supreme Court, these concerns were raised
in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group,121 a case holding
that IPRs do not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the
Constitution.122 At oral arguments, several Justices brought up panel
stacking: Chief Justice Roberts asked whether panel stacking comports with
due process;123 Justice Anthony Kennedy asked counsel whether his view on
panel stacking would change if the practice “were rampant”;124 Justice
Gorsuch asked about the constitutionality of adjudicatory proceedings
subject to packing by a director who is “unhappy with the results”;125 and
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked if panel stacking would be an “obvious
due process flaw.”126 Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion continued his
criticism of panel stacking, where he derided the patent statute’s
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1015–16.
119. Id. at 1016 (“Nor need we address . . . Nidec’s argument that the Board’s practice of
expanding panels violates due process.”).
120. Target Corp. v. Destiny Maternity Corp., No. IPR2014-00508, at 3–5, 19 (P.T.A.B.
Feb. 12, 2015).
121. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
122. Id. at 1378–79.
123. Chief Justice Roberts asked counsel:
What about—in terms of due process anyway . . . this business . . . that the
commissioner can change the—the panels if she doesn’t agree with the direction
they’re going, that she can add new judges to the panel so that they’ll—in other
words, it’s a—the panel itself—and I think constitutionally this may be fine, is—is
a tool of the executive activity, rather than something involving some—anything
resembling a determination of rights?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712).
124. Id. at 34.
125. Id. at 37.
126. Id. at 66.

2020]

THE PRECEDENTIAL OPINION PANEL

743

“efficiency.”127 Judge Timothy Dyk of the Federal Circuit also commented
on panel stacking in his concurrence to the decision in Nidec, expressing
concern about the use of expanding panels.128
Although no recent case law has addressed panel stacking head-on, one
pre-AIA Federal Circuit case addressed a similar situation. In re Alappat129
concerns the appeal from a reconsideration decision of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences130 (BPAI) of the USPTO, which sustained the
rejection of a patent.131 An examiner rejected Alappat’s patent under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to unpatentable subject matter.132 Alappat
appealed this rejection to the BPAI, and a three-member panel reversed the
examiner’s rejection.133 The examiner then requested a rehearing by an
expanded panel on the grounds that the three-member panel’s decision was
in conflict with USPTO policy.134 An expanded eight-member panel granted
the examiner’s request for rehearing.135 The five new members of the panel
were the USPTO commissioner, USPTO deputy commissioner, USPTO
assistant commissioner, board chairman, and board vice-chairman.136 The

127. Justice Gorsuch wrote,
Consider just how efficient the statute before us is. The Director of the Patent Office
is a political appointee who serves at the pleasure of the President. He supervises
and pays the Board members responsible for deciding patent disputes. The Director
is allowed to select which of these members, and how many of them, will hear any
particular patent challenge. If they (somehow) reach a result he does not like, the
Director can add more members to the panel—including himself—and order the
case reheard. Nor has the Director proven bashful about asserting these statutory
powers to secure the ‘policy judgments’ he seeks.
No doubt this efficient scheme is well intended. But can there be any doubt that
it also represents a retreat from the promise of judicial independence?
Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1380–81 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(quoting Brief for Petitioner at 46, Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712)).
128. In his concurrence, Judge Dyk wrote,
[W]e are also concerned about the PTO’s practice of expanding administrative
panels to decide requests for rehearing in order to ‘secure and maintain uniformity
of the Board’s decisions.’
. . .While we recognize the importance of achieving uniformity in PTO
decisions, we question whether the practice of expanding panels where the PTO is
dissatisfied with a panel’s earlier decision is the appropriate mechanism of achieving
the desired uniformity.
Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (Dyk, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Intervenor–Director of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office at 27, Nidec, 868 F.3d 1013 (No. 2016-2321)).
129. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
130. The BPAI was replaced by the PTAB. “Any reference in any Federal law, Executive
order, rule, regulation, or delegation of authority, or any document of or pertaining to the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences is deemed to refer to the [PTAB].” 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
131. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1531.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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five new members then issued the majority opinion affirming the examiner’s
rejection of Alappat’s patent, with the original three members dissenting.137
Alappat appealed to the Federal Circuit challenging the BPAI’s decision
that found his invention unpatentable.138 However, Alappat did not
challenge the validity of the expanded panel’s decision.139 Regardless, the
Federal Circuit addressed the authority of the BPAI to expand a panel on
rehearing in part one of the opinion and the merits of the BPAI’s decision in
part two.140 In part one, Judge Giles Rich was joined by Judges Pauline
Newman, Alan Lourie, and Randall Rader in the plurality; Chief Judge Glenn
Archer and Judges Helen Nies and S. Jay Plager concurred in the conclusion;
and Judges Haldane Mayer, Paul Michel, Raymond Clevenger, and Alvin
Schall dissented.141 The plurality found that, according to the plain meaning
of the then applicable patent statute, the commissioner had “the authority to
designate the members of a panel to consider a request for reconsideration of
a [BPAI] decision,”142 including “designating an expanded panel made up of
the members of an original panel, other members of the [BPAI], and himself
as such, to consider a request for reconsideration of a decision rendered by
that original panel.”143 Chief Judge Archer refused to hold that the BPAI
composition was illegal, stating that “[p]recedent precludes us from holding
that the composition of the agency’s board is illegal where none of the parties
has raised the issue.”144 Even so, Chief Judge Archer felt that the BPAI
composition was not in violation of the statute.145 Judge Plager concurred
separately, noting that “there remains opportunity for attack should the
Commissioner again reconstitute a board the way he did here—does he
violate his own regulations, is there a due process question, what is the exact
scope of the legislative grant of authority—that attack has not here been
launched.”146 Two dissenting opinions reasoned that the commissioner did
not have the authority to expand the panel as he did in this case.147
The takeaway from In re Alappat is that a severely fractured Federal
Circuit held panel stacking was permissible in a pre-AIA USPTO
proceeding. However, the due process issue was not raised on appeal, and
the opinion only addresses whether panel stacking is statutorily permissible
and not whether it would survive a due process challenge.148
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1530.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1532.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1546 (Archer, C.J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1548.
146. Id. at 1581 (Plager, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1571, 1583–85.
148. The majority wrote:
Amicus Curiae FCBA suggests that the Commissioner’s redesignation practices in
this case violated Alappat’s due process rights . . . .
The FCBA does not have standing to make a due process argument and Alappat
has waived any due process argument by acquiescing to the Commissioner’s actions
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3. Panel Stacking and Due Process
Outside of direct judicial criticisms, parties to cases where panel stacking
has occurred, amicus briefs, and independent scholars have challenged panel
stacking as violative of due process. Part I.B.3 surveys and categorizes those
criticisms.
a. Under the Mathews Framework
One critic has used the Mathews v. Eldridge149 framework to find that
panel stacking raises due process concerns. The Mathews framework seeks
to determine “whether the administrative procedures provided . . . are
constitutionally sufficient.”150 The test requires the balancing of three
factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action”;151 (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”;152 and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”153
As to the first Mathews factor, a court may find that patent rights are
substantial but not quite on the level of a fundamental liberty or property
interest.154 Panel stacking potentially presents several problems under the
second Mathews factor. First, it may be difficult to separate questions of law
and policy from questions of fact, so that panel stacking only affects the
questions of law and policy.155 Next, the director’s individual views on
policy may not define what is “correct” for the PTAB, as the PTAB is the

in this case. Thus, there is no case or controversy before this court with respect to
any alleged due process violation.
Id. at 1536 (citations omitted).
149. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Critics have also used the Mathews framework to suggest that
IPR, in general, may be unconstitutional. See generally James Carmichael & Brad Close,
Despite Oil States, Inter Partes Review May Still Be Held Unconstitutional, IPWATCHDOG
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/25/despite-oil-states-inter-partesreview-may-still-be-held-unconstitutional/id=96406 [https://perma.cc/PC22-GDVJ].
150. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
151. Id. at 335.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. A patent right is arguably not at the level of a fundamental liberty interest or property
interest:
For a patent applicant or owner, the relevant private interest in PTAB
proceedings is securing patent rights or their continuing enforceability. This is a
significant interest, one that could be worth millions or even hundreds of millions
of dollars. But a court would not likely view such an interest as on par either with
fundamental liberty interests, or with property interests, such as welfare
entitlements, that more predictably implicate individuals’ basic capacities to pursue
happiness.
John M. Golden, PTO Panel Stacking: Unblessed by the Federal Circuit and Likely Unlawful,
104 IOWA L. REV. 2447, 2463 (2019) (footnotes omitted).
155. Id. at 2464.
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statutorily charged adjudicator, not the director.156 Also, deciding an issue
of policy or law by means of panel stacking does not involve the reasoned
process of adjudication or rulemaking.157 These three facts taken together
increase the risk of an erroneous deprivation of patent rights by panel
stacking. Panel stacking also presents several problems under the third
Mathews factor. First, panel stacking may compromise the reasoned process
of decision-making.158 It may harm the “perceived legitimacy, integrity, and
fairness of [USPTO] decision-making.”159 And on top of this, it increases
administrative costs to the agency.160 Also, other mechanisms exist, like
rulemaking and designating opinions as precedential, that the director may
use to maintain consistency.161
b. Other Due Process Criticisms
Panel stacking is often compared to the situation in Utica Packing Co. v.
Block,162 where a Department of Agriculture adjudicator issued a decision
that the department “violently disagreed” with.163 The secretary of
agriculture removed the adjudicator from the case and replaced him with
someone who was not a lawyer and had not performed any “adjudicatory,
regulatory or legal work.”164 The Sixth Circuit found this violated due
process, noting “[t]here is no guarantee of fairness when the one who
appoints a judge has the power to remove the judge before the end of
proceedings for rendering a decision which displeases the appointer.”165
However, it is important to note that the situation in Utica Packing is not a
perfect analog to panel stacking; in fact, there are some major differences
between the two situations, something that the USPTO has pointed out.166
One party has further argued that panel stacking implicates due process
concerns because the decision of the PTAB is not being made by impartial
decision makers but, rather, by the director, who selectively staffs panels to
achieve the preferred interpretation.167 This criticism suggests such
decisions by the PTAB do not accurately reflect independent adjudicative
interpretations of statutes by judges but, rather, “the Director’s policy stance

156. Id. at 2464–65.
157. See id. at 2465–66.
158. Id. at 2466.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2467.
162. 781 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Biotechnology
Innovation Organization in Support of Appellant at 20–21, Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan
Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 2016-2321); Golden, supra note
154, at 2473–74; Walker & Wasserman, supra note 87, at 183–86.
163. Utica Packing, 781 F.2d at 78.
164. Id. at 74.
165. Id. at 78.
166. Brief for Intervenor–Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office at 23,
Nidec, 868 F.3d 1013 (No. 2016-2321).
167. Brief of Appellant at 42, Nidec, 868 F.3d 1013 (No. 2016-2321).
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without the procedural protections of notice-and-comment rulemaking.”168
However, this party clarifies that it was not alleging the director orders judges
to decide a certain way, nor that judges’ decisions are not the product of their
own independent judgments, but rather that panel stacking undercuts the
independence of the PTAB as a whole.169
A similar criticism is that panel stacking “strips the adjudicatory board of
its impartial nature”170 and goes against the requirement that “[t]he one who
decides must hear.”171 This criticism notes that panel stacking ensures an
outcome, making the decision of the PTAB as a whole partial and that
“outcomes are improperly put before the consideration of evidence and
argument.”172 However, one critic has in fact suggested that panel stacking
may undercut the decision-making authority of adjudicators at the individual
level.173
Another critic has also suggested that panel stacking is a form of
prejudgment.174 This criticism notes at the outset that typical cases of
prejudgment involve a public display of disapproval by an adjudicator before
the case is heard.175 This criticism recognizes that panel stacking is distinct
from this situation but still represents a type of prejudgment where prestacked
odds create a biased tribunal.176
C. The POP
Continued use of panel stacking by the director would have no doubt
drawn continued challenges and criticisms from interested parties. Most
likely in response to the criticisms of panel stacking, the USPTO created the
POP, a special panel within the PTAB comprised of agency leadership that
is tasked with handling issues of particular importance in PTAB
adjudication.177 Part I.C explains the creation of the POP, how parties can
request POP review, and how the USPTO will institute POP review. Part I.C
also surveys recent uses of the POP.

168. Id.
169. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). “It is this coordination of [PTAB] decisions through
readjudication that implicates due process concerns and renders judicial review particularly
appropriate here.” Id.
170. Walker & Wasserman, supra note 87, at 185.
171. Id. (quoting Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936)).
172. Id. at 185–86.
173. Golden, supra note 154, at 2472 (comparing the director’s authority to select panel
members and to determine the pay of the APJs and the director’s “presumably good position”
to play a role in the removal of APJs to the situation in Esso Standard Oil Co. v. López-Freytes,
522 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2008)).
174. Olivia Martzahn, Note, Due Process Implications of Panel Stacking at the USPTO,
44 J. CORP. L. 423, 435 (2019).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Revisions to Standard Operating Procedures: Paneling and Precedential Decisions,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-applicationprocess/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/procedures/revisions-standard-operating
[https://perma.cc/F9NQ-RB3M].
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1. Creation
On September 20, 2018, the PTAB substantially revised its SOPs
regarding paneling and precedential opinions.178 The revisions are intended
to “increase[] transparency, predictability, and reliability across the
USPTO.”179 The revised SOPs are broken into two parts.180 The first part,
SOP 1, “explains the procedures for panel assignment and for informing
parties regarding panel changes.”181 The second part, SOP 2, creates the
POP, states its primary functions, and explains its operation.182
SOP 1 explains the process of expanding panels beyond three judges but
cautions against it.183 Specifically, SOP 1 suggests expanded panels may be
appropriate “to secure and maintain uniformity of the Board’s decisions.”184
However, SOP 1 also clarifies that “[r]easons such as establishing binding
agency authority concerning major policy or procedural issues, or other
issues of exceptional importance, are generally expected to be addressed
using the procedures set forth in [SOP 2].”185 SOP 1 sets out the means by
which an expanded panel should be suggested and provides that the director
has ultimate authority to approve the use of an expanded panel.186
SOP 2 creates the POP, which is intended to establish binding agency
authority concerning major policy or procedural issues or other exceptionally
important issues.187 A nonexhaustive list of examples in SOP 2 provides that
the POP may be used to “address constitutional questions; important issues
regarding statutes, rules, and regulations; important issues regarding binding
or precedential case law; or issues of broad applicability to the [PTAB],” as
well as “to resolve conflicts between [PTAB] decisions, to promote certainty
and consistency, or to rehear any case it determines warrants the [POP’s]
attention.”188
SOP 2 provides that the director selects POP members, but, by default, the
POP shall include the director, the commissioner for patents, and the chief
APJ.189 The director has the discretion to determine that an expanded panel
of the POP “is appropriate in certain circumstances.”190 The director may
also decide to switch a “default member[] of the [POP] with the Deputy
Director, the Deputy Chief Judge, or an Operational Vice Chief Judge, in any

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 91, at 15–16.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15 n.4.
Id. at 15.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REVISION 10), at 1 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NW5-4M8H].
188. Id. at 4.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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case.”191 These restrictions do not defeat the fact that the director may
convene a POP consisting of any board members, at any time, to review any
matter, at the director’s sole discretion.192 Despite the director’s broad
authority to convene a POP, SOP 2 sets forth two other ways to obtain POP
review: (1) recommendation by any party to a proceeding for review of that
proceeding or (2) recommendation by any member of the board.193
However, there is no right to further review of a denial of a recommendation
for POP review.194 POP review recommendations go to a screening
committee that is comprised of the POP members and their designees, who
forwards their recommendations to the director.195 Based on the committee’s
recommendation, the director “will convene a [POP] to decide whether to
grant rehearing.”196 Then, if the POP decides to grant a rehearing, they will
“render a decision on rehearing in the case.”197 Note that the director does
not decide whether to grant rehearing, the POP does.198 This is consistent
with the statutory provision that provides the PTAB with the authority to
grant rehearings.199
The POP may request additional briefing on issues, authorize the filings of
amicus briefs, and order oral hearings.200 In certain circumstances, it may
delegate its authority back to the original PTAB panel assigned to the case.201
In this situation, the original panel has to keep the POP apprised of matters
and give notice before an intended decision but can handle delegated matters
without POP direction.202 If prior proceedings are needed after a POP
decision, the prior PTAB panel assigned to the case conducts the
proceedings.203
As its name makes obvious, POP decisions are precedential204 and
therefore binding PTAB authority for similar future matters.205 Though SOP
2 provides processes by which PTAB decisions may be designated or dedesignated as precedential,206 it explicitly reserves the director’s authority to

191. Id. Also, the primary members of the POP may delegate their authority, “in the
following order and based on availability: the Deputy Director; the Deputy Chief Judge; or
an Operational Vice Chief Judge in order of seniority.” Id. However, a member may only
delegate authority “for reasons including conflicts of interest and availability or when the
issues to be decided are directed to procedural aspects of practice before the [PTAB].” Id.
192. Id. at 4–5.
193. Id. at 5–6.
194. Id. at 6.
195. Id. at 6–7.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. “Each . . . [IPR] shall be heard by at least 3 members of the [PTAB], who shall be
designated by the Director. Only the [PTAB] may grant rehearings.” 35 U.S.C. § 6(c).
200. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 7.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 8.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 11.
206. See id. at 8–12.
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“designate or de-designate an issued decision or portion thereof as
precedential or informative at any time, in his or her sole discretion.”207
2. Uses of the POP
Thus far, the POP has been utilized in four IPRs: Proppant Express
Investments, LLC v. Oren Technologies, LLC;208 Hulu, LLC v. Sound View
Innovations, LLC;209 GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc.;210 and Hunting Titan,
Inc. v. DynaEnergetics Europe GmbH.211
In Proppant, Proppant requested IPR on one claim of Oren Technologies’s
patent and asked it to be joined with an already pending IPR of different
claims of the same patent.212 The PTAB did not institute the new IPR
because the petitioner’s request was faulty.213 When Proppant cured the
defects, the PTAB again denied its request.214 The PTAB interpreted
§ 315(c) as providing authority to join only “other parties to existing
proceedings without introducing new issues of patentability.”215 So, the
PTAB denied the motion for joinder because the petitioner was already a
party to the existing IPR and only sought to introduce new issues to it.216
The PTAB denied the new IPR petition under § 315(b) because, by the time
Proppant had cured its faulty filing, Proppant had been served with a
complaint alleging infringement of the patent more than one year before the
date on which the petition was filed.217
Proppant requested rehearing of the PTAB’s decision and, because PTAB
decisions conflict on the proper interpretation of § 315(c), the POP ordered a
review on rehearing.218 This POP consisted of its three default members: the
director, the commissioner for patents, and the chief APJ.219 Ultimately, the
POP’s decision reached the same outcome as the first panel and did not
institute the new IPR that Proppant was requesting.220 However, they noted
that § 315(c) “provides discretion to grant same party and issue joinder, but
the Board will exercise its discretion only in limited circumstances where
fairness requires it and to avoid undue prejudice to a party.”221 The POP
decided not to exercise that discretion in this case because the petitioner’s
own conduct created the need for joinder.222 As to the § 315(b) issue, the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 11 n.4 (emphasis added).
No. IPR2018-00914, 2019 WL 1283948 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2019).
No. IPR2018-01039, 2019 WL 7000067 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2019).
No. IPR2018-01754, 2019 WL 3992792 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2019).
No. IPR2018-00600, 2020 WL 3669653 (P.T.A.B. July 6, 2020).
Proppant, 2019 WL 1283948, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.

2020]

THE PRECEDENTIAL OPINION PANEL

751

POP found that since Proppant was served with a complaint alleging
infringement of the patent more than one year before the date on which the
IPR petition was filed, it had to be denied.223
In GoPro, GoPro filed a petition requesting institution of IPR of certain
claims of 360Heros’s patent.224 360Heros filed a preliminary response
arguing that GoPro was time-barred from filing its petition under § 315(b).225
The PTAB instituted an IPR anyway.226 360Heros requested rehearing and
POP review of the board’s decision.227
The POP, consisting of its three default members, ordered a review on
rehearing.228 The rehearing was to address the issue of whether the service
of a pleading alleging infringement, where the serving party lacks standing
to sue or the pleading is otherwise deficient, triggers the one-year time period
for a petitioner to file a petition under § 315(b).229 The POP found that a
faulty pleading still triggers the time bar under § 315(b) and since GoPro’s
petition in this case was filed more than one year after they were properly
served with a complaint, its petition was time-barred under § 315(b).230
Notably, the above mentioned POP decisions deal with the same statutory
provisions that were at issue in past cases involving panel stacking.231 Nidec
and Target both deal with § 315(c), and so does Proppant.232 Nidec deals
with § 315(b), and so does GoPro.233 This suggests that APJs have not
always been aligned with the director’s policy interpretation of § 315 and that
the use of panel stacking and the creation of the POP may have been
necessitated, in part, by this conflict of interpretation.
The other two uses of the POP deal with cases in which the POP found
against the original PTAB panel but did not involve interpretation of § 315.
In Hulu, the POP ordered a review on rehearing to decide what is required
for a petitioner at the institution stage to establish that a prior art reference is
a “printed publication.”234 The original PTAB panel found there was
insufficient evidence to show one of the petitioner’s references was publicly
accessible and therefore the petitioner failed to show sufficiently that the
reference qualified as prior art.235 On rehearing, the POP found against the
223. Id.
224. GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., No. IPR2018-01754, 2019 WL 3992792, at *1
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2019).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *10–11.
231. See supra notes 107–20 and accompanying text.
232. See generally Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d
1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Proppant Express Invs., LLC v. Oren Techs., LLC, No. IPR201800914, 2019 WL1283948 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2019); Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity
Corp., No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2015).
233. See generally Nidec, 868 F.3d 1013; GoPro, 2019 WL 3992792.
234. Hulu, LLC, v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, 2019 WL
7000067, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2019).
235. Id.
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original PTAB panel, concluding that the petitioner had established a
reasonable likelihood that its reference was a printed publication that was
publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent.236 In
Hunting Titan, the POP granted the patent owner’s request for a POP review
to decide under what circumstances the PTAB may sua sponte raise its own
issues of patentability on a motion to amend a patent.237 Ultimately, the POP
delineated certain circumstances in which the PTAB may raise its own issues
of patentability on a motion to amend but ultimately decided that the actions
of the original PTAB panel did not fit into one of these circumstances.238
II. DOES THE POP RESOLVE DUE PROCESS CONCERNS?
The POP is intended to establish binding agency authority concerning
major policy, procedural issues, and other exceptionally important issues.239
The POP is likely to supplant panel stacking240 and therefore, it should
alleviate the due process concerns that accompanied panel stacking. Part II
analyzes the ways in which the POP addresses the due process concerns
raised by panel stacking and questions whether the POP has its own unique
due process concerns. Part II.A summarizes arguments that the POP
alleviates the due process concerns raised by the USPTO’s prior practice of
panel stacking. Part II.B evaluates the POP under both the Mathews
framework241 and a fair hearing analysis to determine where it lacks due
process.
A. The POP Alleviates the Due Process Concerns of Panel Stacking
Part II.A evaluates the POP under both the Mathews test and under a fair
hearing analysis. Part II.A finds that most of the POP’s success in alleviating
the due process concerns raised by panel stacking stems from the fact that the
director cannot unilaterally decide the outcome of PTAB decisions as a
member of the POP.
1. There Are Due Process Protections Under the Mathews Test
One critic has analyzed panel stacking under the Mathews test to raise due
process concerns with the practice.242 However, some of the criticisms
aimed at panel stacking under this framework no longer apply to the POP.
The first factor of the Mathews test, which looks to the private interest that
will be affected by the official action,243 does not need to be further analyzed,
236. Id. at *8.
237. Hunting Titan, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics Eur. GmbH, No. IPR2018-00600, 2020 WL
3669653, at *1–2 (P.T.A.B. July 6, 2020).
238. Id. at *11.
239. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 1.
240. See Revisions to Standard Operating Procedures: Paneling and Precedential
Decisions, supra note 177.
241. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
242. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
243. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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as it is the same with panel stacking and the POP. Both involve an IPR on
rehearing and so they affect patent rights.244 Patent rights are of significant
interest, but one critic has argued they likely do not rise to the level of a
fundamental liberty or property interest.245
There are a number of ways that the POP fares better than panel stacking
under the second Mathews factor: “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probative value, if any, of
additional [or substitute] procedural safeguards.”246 Panel stacking was
criticized under this factor for its potential shortcoming in separating
decisions of law and policy from decisions of fact.247 Before, the director
was arguably deciding matters of policy when the director would selectively
manipulate the makeup of a panel to find a certain way.248 Now, the director
is one member of the panel that decides questions of policy.249 The director,
along with fellow POP members, can work together to separate questions of
law and policy from questions of fact to reduce errors. Panel stacking was
further criticized under the second Mathews factor because, although the
director has policymaking power, the director’s view cannot be the view of
the PTAB.250 Therefore, there was reason to question what the director
deemed to be “correct” as a matter of PTAB policy.251 However, unlike
panel stacking, where the director’s views arguably became the views of the
PTAB, in POP review, the director is only one member of the panel casting
a vote.252 Therefore, the director can no longer unilaterally decide what is
“correct” in terms of PTAB policy. Panel stacking was further criticized
under the second Mathews factor because of skepticism as to whether the
director “hits upon the correct understanding of policy or statutory language
without having gone through the process of issuing a rule or acting as a
legally responsible adjudicator.”253 Basically, the reasoned nature of
rulemaking and adjudication poses less risk of erroneous deprivation than
panel stacking.254 The fact that the director is now part of the adjudication
as a POP panel member solves this issue.255
There are a number of ways that POP fares better than panel stacking under
the third Mathews factor: “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”256 Under this factor, critics
have pointed out potential problems of perceived legitimacy, integrity, and
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Golden, supra note 154, at 2463.
Id.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Golden, supra note 154, at 2464.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 167, at 42.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 3–4.
Golden, supra note 154, at 2464–65.
Id.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 4.
Golden, supra note 154, at 2465.
Id.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 4.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

754

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

fairness of decision-making with panel stacking.257 One critic of panel
stacking saw the practice as undermining PTAB authority and shortcircuiting the IPR process.258 It is difficult for one to make the above
arguments against the POP. Although panel stacking and the POP both
involve rehearing, in panel stacking the ultimate outcome of the IPR was
effectively decided when the director chose specific judges to add to the
panel.259 Now, under POP review, the ultimate decision in the underlying
IPR is not made until all panel members vote.260 Besides the fact that the
panel is made up of agency leadership, the POP’s review is like any other
IPR on rehearing.
2. The POP Conducts a Fair Hearing
A past criticism of panel stacking was that it did not provide a fair hearing
that would comport with due process.261 As an alternative to panel stacking,
POP review alleviates some of the concerns regarding director manipulation
of PTAB results. In POP review, the director sits as one member of the panel
that decides the outcome of adjudication.262 Although the director has the
authority to convene a POP, the director cannot directly decide its
outcome.263 So long as a POP is convened as its default three-member panel,
the director’s vote only counts as one out of three.264 In Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith
& Nephew, Inc.,265 the Federal Circuit echoed this point, specifically noting
the director’s lack of control over fellow POP members’ votes.266
Critics of panel stacking pointed to its similarities to Utica Packing, in
which the Sixth Circuit found a due process violation in agency
adjudication.267 The similarities between the two situations created a strong
case for panel stacking as a due process violation.268 Utica Packing is now
arguably not relevant to the due process analysis of the POP. Unlike the
situation in Utica Packing, when the director convenes a POP, the director
does not remove adjudicators with whom the director disagrees269 and, unlike
panel stacking, the director does not add adjudicators to existing panels with
whose decision the director disagrees.270
257. See supra Part I.B.3.
258. Golden, supra note 154, at 2465–66.
259. Brief of Appellant, supra note 167, at 42.
260. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 7.
261. See supra Part I.B.3.
262. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 4.
263. Id. at 7.
264. Id.
265. 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
266. Id. at 1330 (“[E]ven if the Director placed himself on the [POP] to decide whether to
rehear the case, the decision to rehear a case and the decision on rehearing would still be
decided by a panel, two-thirds of which is not appointed by the President. There is no
guarantee that the Director would even be in the majority of that decision.”).
267. Utica Packing Co. v. Block, 781 F.2d 71, 78 (6th Cir. 1986).
268. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
269. Even during POP review, the original panel maintains some level of involvement with
the case. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 7–8.
270. See supra Part I.B.1.
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The POP is a completely different PTAB panel than the panel that
adjudicated in the first instance. It is technically conducting a rehearing, but
it operates more like an appellate court. Although the director ultimately
decides to initiate POP review, review can be requested by parties,
adjudicators, and agency officials.271 The POP as a whole, not just the
director, must vote to grant the rehearing.272 Instituting a POP is not a form
of punishment like in Utica Packing; it is the result of a reasoned decisionmaking process in which multiple stakeholders are allowed to partake.273
B. The POP Does Not Alleviate Panel-Stacking Due Process Concerns and
Raises Its Own
The POP does succeed in some respects as a solution to panel stacking;
however, it is not perfect. The POP fails to address the problems with PTAB
panel assignments that originally led to panel stacking. The POP may also
raise its own unique concerns with due process. Part II.B discusses the fact
that the director still maintains power to manipulate the POP, which presents
almost the same due process concerns raised by panel stacking. This part
also observes that the director’s presence on the POP as a member may
influence fellow panel members in a way that would create due process
issues.
1. Due Process Concerns Under the Mathews Test
Under the second Mathews factor, risk of erroneous deprivation,274 critics
argue that under POP review the director is still acting as the policy decision
maker for the PTAB.275 The director ultimately has the power to institute
POP review and therefore decides for the PTAB which matters of policy are
important enough for a rehearing.276 The director could still be “incorrectly”
deciding what is important in terms of PTAB policy. However, this argument
may contradict the fact that the director does not decide to grant rehearing,
since only the PTAB has that statutory authority.277 While the director can
convene a POP, the director cannot unilaterally decide whether the POP will
actually grant rehearing in the case and address the matter of policy.278
Under the second Mathews factor, critics may argue that the POP is still
an ineffective means of maintaining consistency in PTAB decisions, as
compared to rulemaking. Why constantly decide the same or similar issues
by way of adjudication when the agency can settle them all through sweeping
rulemaking? With each instance of adjudication, the agency runs the risk of
misinterpreting the issue. Of course, agencies may choose to decide issues
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 4–7.
Id. at 7.
See supra notes 187–207 and accompanying text.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See supra Part I.B.3.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 3–5.
35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (“Only the [PTAB] may grant rehearings.”).
See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 7.
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through adjudication or rulemaking.279 Furthermore, there may be instances
in which POP review is preferable to rulemaking.280 The decisions of the
POP are precedential, so they are binding on future PTAB decisions and
theoretically do not require revisiting the same underlying issues.281
A criticism of panel stacking under the third Mathews factor was the
additional administrative costs it created, as opposed to simply accepting the
decision of the original panel.282 Ignoring the fact that the point of both panel
stacking and POP review is to readdress the original decision—which
necessarily includes additional administrative costs—this criticism still
remains at issue in regard to POP review. POP review is a rehearing and, by
definition, requires administrative resources.283 Panel stacking was
criticized since the USPTO had alternative means of maintaining
consistency, for example, through rulemaking and designating certain
opinions as precedential.284 While rulemaking remains an alternative means
of maintaining consistency, the decisions of the POP are precedential,
another means of increasing uniformity.285
2. POP Review Involves an Unfair Hearing
The POP presents its own major fair hearing issue: the director now sits
on the panel that decides the case.286 At the outset, it is important to note the
director is a statutory member of the PTAB and has the authority to sit on a
panel.287 Yet the director’s presence on the POP raises several concerning
questions.
First, when deciding to institute a POP, has the director already prejudged
the case? A POP may be requested by a number of different interested
actors288 and is recommended to the director by a number of agency
actors,289 but the director has the ultimate authority to convene a POP.290 For
the POP to grant rehearing, each member of the panel must vote to grant it.291
Instituting a POP can be the result of a reasoned process involving many
279. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
280. Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative
Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 1017 (1991) (“[O]ther inconsistencies can
perhaps be uncovered only as a result of careful review by a monitoring panel. Such
monitoring might indeed identify ALJs who are unduly prone to positive or negative errors,
but, because of the fact-specific nature of each case, their performance is not amenable to
correction by rule.”).
281. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 8, 11.
282. Golden, supra note 154, at 2466.
283. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 5, 7.
284. Golden, supra note 154, at 2467.
285. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 3–4.
286. Id. at 4.
287. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
288. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 5–6.
289. Id. at 6–7.
290. See id. at 5 n.2.
291. Id. at 7.
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actors,292 but this reasoned process may not matter if the director can
institute POP review at any time.293 When deciding to institute a POP, the
director has already decided the importance of the issue that the IPR in
question presents and may also have communicated a desire to find against
the original panel who decided the IPR at issue. This could mean that the
director has prejudged the case before sitting as an adjudicator on a POP.
Regarding voting on the eventual decision of the POP, the director’s
participation in a hearing may be superficial if the director has already
decided the issue. Of the four instances in which the POP has been utilized
thus far, three rehearing panels found against the original panels.294
Second, will the director’s presence on the panel influence fellow panel
members? The default members of the POP are the director, the
commissioner for patents, and the chief APJ.295 The secretary of commerce
appoints, decides the bonuses for, and can remove the commissioner.296
However, the director is involved in this process. The commissioner has an
annual performance agreement with the secretary of commerce that
influences the commissioner’s ability to receive a bonus and the secretary’s
decision to fire the commissioner.297 The commissioner’s ability to receive
a bonus is based on an evaluation by the secretary, acting through the
director, of the commissioner’s performance, as defined in an annual
performance agreement.298 The secretary’s decision to remove the
commissioner is also based on the same performance agreement.299
Therefore, the director is involved to some extent in deciding the
commissioner’s bonus and removal. While it does not necessarily follow that
the director would punish the commissioner with a poor evaluation should
the two not agree on POP review, a fellow panel member having some power
over another suggests the appearance of partiality.
This is similar for the chief APJ. As an APJ, the chief APJ’s pay is decided
by the director.300 After the Federal Circuit’s decision in Arthrex, it appears

292. See supra notes 187–207 and accompanying text.
293. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 5 n.2.
294. See Hunting Titan, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics Eur. GmbH, No. IPR2018-00600, 2020
WL 3669653, at *11 (P.T.A.B. July 6, 2020) (vacating the original PTAB panel’s final written
decision and granting the motion to amend); Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC,
No. IPR2018-01039, 2019 WL 7000067, at *8–9 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2019) (remanding the
matter to the original PTAB merits panel and granting the request for rehearing); GoPro, Inc.
v. 360Heros, Inc., No. IPR2018-01754, 2019 WL 3992792, at *10–11 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 23,
2019) (denying the institution of inter partes review where the original PTAB panel instituted
trial). But see Proppant Express Invs., LLC v. Oren Techs., LLC, No. IPR2018-00914, 2019
WL 1283948, at *1, *10 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2019) (denying a motion for joinder and denying
a petition for inter partes review where the original PTAB panel came to the same conclusion).
295. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 4.
296. 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(2).
297. Id. § 3(b)(2)(B)–(C).
298. Id. § 3(b)(2)(B).
299. Id. § 3(b)(2)(C).
300. Id. § 3(b)(6).
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the director can remove APJs without cause.301 This may put the chief APJ
in a precarious position when sitting on a POP with the director. Independent
of compensation and removal power, panel members still may be unwilling
to vote against the director, just by nature of the director’s position at the
USPTO.302
The director remains able to manipulate the POP and any other PTAB
panel.303 Although the POP has default members304 and, so far, the POP has
only been convened with its default members,305 the director has explicitly
maintained authority to convene a POP consisting of any PTAB member that
the director chooses.306 If the director is unsure if fellow panel members will
be on the director’s side, there is always the possibility that the director can
stack the POP. This would raise the same due process concerns associated
with panel stacking.307 However, it may be even more offensive than the
original instances of panel stacking because the POP is expected to replace
this practice.308 Therefore, stacking the POP would defeat the entire purpose
of its creation.
Some judges have even posited that the director’s use of the POP exerts
influence over the director’s fellow PTAB members. Responding to the
Arthrex court’s downplay of the director’s role on the POP, Judges Todd
Hughes and Evan Wallach noted that Arthrex
fail[ed] to recognize the practical influence the director wields with the
power to hand-pick a panel, particularly when the director sits on that panel.
The director’s ability to unilaterally designate or de-designate a decision as
precedential and to convene a POP of the size and composition of his
choosing are therefore important tools for the direction and supervision of
the board even after it issues a final written decision.309

301. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc, 941 F.3d 1320, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Title 5
U.S.C. § 7513(a) permits agency action against those officers and employees ‘only for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.’ Accordingly, we hold unconstitutional
the statutory removal provisions as applied to APJs, and sever that application.”).
302. One writer, analyzing an FCC review board, stated: “[T]he presence of a
Commissioner might inhibit his Review Board colleagues from disagreeing with him and deter
his colleagues on the agency from reversing Review Board decisions in which he
participated.” James O. Freedman, Review Boards in the Administrative Process, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 546, 566 (1969).
303. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c).
304. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 4.
305. See Hunting Titan, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics Eur. GmbH, No. IPR2018-00600, 2020
WL 3669653, at *1 (P.T.A.B. July 6, 2020); Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC,
No. IPR2018-01039, 2019 WL 7000067, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2019); GoPro, Inc. v.
360Heros, Inc., No. IPR2018-01754, 2019 WL 3992792, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2019);
Proppant Express Invs., LLC v. Oren Express Solutions, LLC, No. IPR2018-00914, 2019 WL
1283948, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2019).
306. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 4–5.
307. See supra Parts I.B.2–3.
308. Revisions to Standard Operating Procedures: Paneling and Precedential Decisions,
supra note 177.
309. Polaris Innovations Ltd. v. Kingston Tech. Co., 792 F. App’x 820, 824 (Fed. Cir. Jan.
31, 2020) (Hughes, J., concurring).
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III. FINDING A COMPLETE SOLUTION TO PANEL STACKING
SOP 1 states that the use of expanded panels is now not generally favored
and that the POP will be used for “establishing binding agency authority
concerning major policy or procedural issues, or other issues of exceptional
importance.”310 To further solidify this, the USPTO webpage that
announced the new SOPs states explicitly that “[i]t is expected that the POP
and the procedures described in revised SOP2 will, in most cases, replace the
prior practice of expanded paneling under SOP1, with a process that is more
transparent and predictable.”311 If the USPTO’s intention in creating the
POP was truly to replace panel stacking, it should also have aimed to rid
PTAB paneling of the due process concerns that arose with its practice of
panel stacking. While Part II.A of this Note showed that the USPTO may
have achieved its goals in some respects, Part II.B illustrated that not only
are some of the same due process concerns of panel stacking still relevant to
the POP but that the POP has created its own due process concerns.312
Although the director does not unilaterally decide the outcome of POP
adjudications, the director still may have too much influence on its
outcomes.313
Part III suggests alternatives to the use of the POP as a solution to the due
process concerns. This part also suggests how the POP itself can be changed
to better comport with due process. First, as alternatives to the POP,
Congress could grant the director direct agency-head review of adjudication,
or the director could simply decide issues of policy through rulemaking.
Second, the POP itself may be improved to better comport with due process
by removing the director as a member of the POP, making the POP a fixed
panel, or a combination of both.
A. Alternatives to the POP
If the POP is like panel stacking, in that it is a work-around of the director’s
lack of direct review of PTAB adjudications, the best and most obvious
solution remains for Congress to grant the director such power.314 This
would eliminate the need for the director’s use of an extra adjudicative
procedure when a PTAB decision is found to be against agency policy and
alleviate the due process concerns that accompanied such procedures.315
Further, judges have questioned whether the director may even decide issues
of statutory interpretation through the use of the POP. In the concurrence of
Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 316 Chief Judge Sharon Prost
and Judges Plager and Kathleen O’Malley found that the POP’s decision in
310. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 91, at 15 n.4.
311. Revisions to Standard Operating Procedures: Paneling and Precedential Decisions,
supra note 177.
312. See supra Part II.
313. See supra Part II.B.
314. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 87, at 189–90.
315. See id.
316. No. 2018-1400, 2020 WL 5267975 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 2020)
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Proppant is not entitled to deference, because the AIA does not authorize
either the director or the PTAB to conduct statutory interpretation through
POP opinions.317
However, some feel that agency-head review of adjudication is itself
problematic.318 Such criticisms find issue with the seemingly unnatural
coexistence of prosecutorial and judicial functions at the agency-head
level.319 In that case, the solution may be to remove the director’s statutory
authority to sit as a member of the PTAB.320 If granting the director direct
review over PTAB adjudications or removing him as a statutory member of
the PTAB are not viable options, there are changes to the POP and
alternatives to its use that may better ensure due process.
Another alternative to POP review is rulemaking.321 Both panel stacking
and two uses of the POP have dealt with issues of how § 315 is interpreted
in PTAB adjudications.322 If panel stacking and the POP have mainly been
used to clarify how this statutory provision will be interpreted in PTAB
adjudications, perhaps the director should instead use the rulemaking power
to interpret these provisions.323 This would preserve consistency in
adjudication without the need to constantly review the decisions of individual
PTAB panels through POP review.324 However, this assumes that once the
rule interpreting these statutory provisions has been instituted, the APJs will
correctly apply the interpretation. Also, the arduous requirements of
rulemaking may render it preferable for the director to proceed with POP
review.325 While no alternative to POP review is perfect, there are a number
of ways that the POP itself may be changed in order to comply with due
process. Finally, a limit to this solution is that the director does not have
substantive rulemaking authority with respect to interpretations of the Patent
Act.326
B. How the POP Can Be Improved to Better Comport with Due Process
One unique due process concern with the POP is that the director’s
presence on the panel may influence fellow panel members’ votes.327 The
317. Id. at *22 (Prost, C.J., concurring) (“There is no indication in the statute that Congress
either intended to delegate broad substantive rulemaking authority to the Director to interpret
statutory provisions through POP opinions or intended him to engage in any rulemaking other
than through the mechanism of prescribing regulations.”).
318. See Gifford, supra note 280, at 977–79.
319. See id.
320. This Note does not attempt to resolve this conflict.
321. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 87, at 190–91.
322. See supra Part I.C.2.
323. 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2), 316(a)(4).
324. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 87, at 190.
325. See id. at 190–91 (“[L]egislative challenges and procedural requirements associated
with rulemaking are nontrivial. The costs associated with rulemaking could be so prohibitive
that the [USPTO] may not be able to rely solely on rulemaking to consistently align PTAB
outcomes with the agency’s policy preferences.”).
326. Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
327. See supra Part II.
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simplest solution to this problem would be to remove the director as a
member of the POP altogether. The default POP members could be the
commissioner for patents, the chief APJ, and an operational vice chief APJ,
or any other USPTO leader fit for the position. This configuration would
ensure that the POP is composed of agency leadership that could properly
deal with issues of policy underlying the IPR before them while maintaining
the appearance of impartiality.
However, this is not a perfect solution. The director is a statutory member
of the PTAB and, since the POP is a special panel within the PTAB, the
director has the authority be a part of it.328 Thus, the director is confronted
with a difficult question: should the director abstain from something that
Congress has explicitly authorized, merely to maintain an appearance of
impartiality? If the director’s presence on the POP is not strictly necessary
to maintain uniformity in the PTAB policy, then it may be wise for the
director to abstain from sitting as a member of the POP.
Another problem arises from the fact that the director is still allowed by
statute to decide the makeup of each PTAB panel.329 Even if removed as a
POP member for the purpose of impartiality, the director could still
manipulate the makeup of the POP in a manner similar to panel stacking.330
This could be especially problematic if the POP, which did not include the
director as a member, found against the policy of the director. The director
could refuse to designate that decision as precedential and order another POP
review with an expanded panel.331 This would be a new form of panel
stacking that would defeat the purpose of the POP.
Another solution would be to limit the POP to its default members. The
default members could be the director, the commissioner for patents, and the
chief APJ. These would be the only three members. None of these members
could be replaced, and no other members could be added. However, the fixed
default members of the POP could delegate their authority to a fixed pool of
other PTAB members, preferably agency leadership, when absolutely
necessary. Overall, this would not be too drastic of a change, as the POP has
only ever sat as a panel of these three members.332 One problem with this
solution is that the director still has the statutory authority to decide the
makeup of a PTAB panel.333 Again, should the director abstain from
something that Congress has explicitly permitted merely to maintain the
appearance of impartiality? If the goal of maintaining PTAB policy can be
achieved without manipulating PTAB panels, it may be wise for the director
to abstain from using statutorily prescribed power in such instances. Another
problem with this proposed solution is that if the director were a fixed POP

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
See id. § 6(c).
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 187, at 4–5.
See id. at 11 n.4.
See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C. § 6(c).
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member, the concerns of potential influence on fellow panel members would
remain.334
The two proposed solutions—the director abstaining from sitting on the
POP and fixing the POP panel membership—are not perfect on their own.
Therefore, the best option may be to merge the two. The POP should be a
fixed three-member panel of agency leadership, not including the director. If
this agency leadership comprising the POP is familiar with agency policy,
the POP could achieve its goal of maintaining consistency of policy decisionmaking, while remaining impartial.
CONCLUSION
The USPTO’s previous method of maintaining consistency of policy in
PTAB adjudication—that is, panel stacking, was criticized by case parties in
which panel stacking occurred. These criticisms mainly illustrated that panel
stacking may violate due process. To quell these constitutional concerns, the
USPTO created the POP, a standing panel within the PTAB consisting of top
agency officials tasked with adjudicating important issues of agency policy.
To some extent, the POP has succeeded in quelling the due process
concerns of panel stacking. This success mainly stems from the fact that the
director is no longer effectively deciding the outcome of an adjudication by
stacking a panel. Now the director is one member of a panel, and the
director’s vote counts only as much as each fellow panel member’s vote.
However, the director’s presence on the POP may influence the decisions of
fellow panel members and therefore raise due process concerns. To ensure
due process in PTAB adjudications, Congress could give the director direct
agency-head review of adjudication, or the director could simply decide
issues of policy via rulemaking. However, the POP itself may better comport
with due process if the director is removed as a default member of the POP
and the POP is fixed to other default members.

334. See supra Part II.B.2.

